



Original Article

Assessing the Effectiveness of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in Indonesia

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Abstract: Terrorism is a criminal or extraordinary crime that concerns today's world, especially in Indonesia. Terrorism that has occurred recently has ideological, historical and political links and is part of the dynamics of the strategic environment at the global and regional levels. Although Indonesians have mostly carried out acts of terrorism in various regions in recent years and only a few external actors. This study uses normative juridical research methods by examining data sources from legal literature and literature review as well as direct interviews with stakeholders related to countermeasures against terrorism. This study aims to discover the role of the BNPT and the authorities in eradicating terrorism and the role of society and community organisations in Indonesia in efforts to deal with terrorism. Observing current developments, BNPT continues to mobilise various elements of the nation to fight radicalism together, promote counter-radicalisation, and work with other government agencies and various media to unify and equalise perceptions in dealing with this threat. The role of the media in eradicating terrorism is not effective enough to balance and purify the mass media from radicalism. The collaboration of roles with various parties is also very necessary. Therefore, the role of the community, community organisations, especially regional heads, political figures, and religious scholars in each region are needed to participate in activities to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia actively.

Keywords: counter-radicalisation; eradicating; National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT); terrorism.



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1. Introduction

In the last few years, the rise of radical social movements among actors has attracted significant attention from a broad audience, academia, civil society, the media, and policymakers. Its social movement is especially when some choose a form of violent action, terrorism or vigilantism, as a pattern of articulation of their social and political radicalism. Department of Social and Political Science, Indonesian University (2018) describes that In Indonesia, from 2010 to 2017, there were 130 cases of terrorism recorded. Eight hundred ninety-six perpetrators have been arrested and sentenced, 126 of them sentenced to death, 674 are currently under sentence, and 96 are free. The number of cases

shows that terrorism is still a severe problem in Indonesia that involves domestic actors and transnational networks. Further, the Department of Social and Political Science, Indonesian University (2018) also explained that terrorism in Indonesia is divided into three periods. The first period was the *Darul Islam* or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* from 1949 to 1954, which wanted to form the Islamic State of Indonesia. Kahar Muzakar led this movement in Sulawesi, Kartosuwiryo in West Java, and Daud Bireuh in Aceh. The second period shows that the trend of terrorism changed to *Jamaah Islamiyyah*, which began in 1983 with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. This terrorist group originated from Al Mukmin Islamic Boarding School in Sukoharjo and spread its radical ideas. *Jamaah Islamiyyah* existed in Indonesia until the early 2000s and succeeded in carrying out the terror of the Bali Bombing 1, the Bali Bombing 2, the Bombing at the Australian Embassy, and the J.W. Marriot Bombing.

The next period is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Global terrorism movements influenced these terrorists centred in Iraq and Syria. These three periods have differences in attack structure, funding and communication patterns, ideological dissemination, and recruitment. The *Jamaah Islamiyyah* period has a neat managerial system, where everyone has their respective roles and responsibilities. Terrorists in the *Jamaah Islamiyyah* period carried out attacks using high-explosive bombs. For funding, the three have in common that the funds used come from three things: individual donations, infiltration of contributions, the results of low-level crime and other organised crime, and business legitimacy. These funds are then transferred to terrorist groups in various ways, for example, through formal mechanisms through banks, informal money transfers, often called *Hawalas* or using humans as couriers. Technology development makes communication network trends, dissemination of ideology, and recruitment different. The ISIS period used blogs, websites, social media, and instant messages to spread its ideology, communicate, and recruit new members.

What is worrying is that the radicalism movement has entered the world of education and young people in the last few years. The suicide bombing, the bomb in Serpong, and the sniffing of the NII (Islamic State of Indonesia) network some time ago confirmed that many radical movements infiltrated their understanding and expanded their network coverage through the campus and school. Students still searching for self-identity and learning to know many things have become the most strategic targets to strengthen this religious radicalism movement. Moreover, the radical movement considers the strategic positions of students with a broad social range and relatively autonomous as the most appropriate and easy means to increase the radical ideologies they are fighting. MAARIF Institute's research in 2011 on the Problem Mapping of Radicalism in Public High Schools in 4 regions (Pandeglang, Cianjur, Yogyakarta, and Solo) took data from 50 schools to confirm the above phenomenon. According to this research, schools are open spaces for disseminating understandings. Because the school is too loose, religious radicalism groups take advantage of this open space to actively campaign for their knowledge and expand their networks.

The religious groups that have entered range from extreme to profane against the state and invitations to establish an Islamic state to Islamist groups who want to fight for the enforcement of Islamic law. Because of this closed religious understanding, their national experience has been reduced and depleted. What is ironic is that many schools do not care about religious ideas taught through their religious activities in schools. It may be because they believe too much in their students' independence or because the religious group enters student activities during school hours. What is also interesting is the MAARIF Institute's research findings that various religious organisations with loud patterns fill the open spaces in schools with their respective agendas. This group also brings understanding. The Islam they understood entered the schoolroom filled the state ideology often taught massively. This state ideology is Pancasila which used to be continuously trained and indoctrinated through Upgrading P4 (Guidelines for Living and Practicing Pancasila). Therefore, the Islamic awareness of 50 state high school students in the four areas studied by the MAARIF Institute is thicker and more robust than their awareness of nationality or citizenship (Fanani, 2013).

Previously, a survey conducted by the Institute for Islamic Studies and Peace (LaKIP) (as cited in (Fanani, 2013) also showed a similar trend. October 2010 to January 2011 was carried out in 59 private schools and 41 public schools in 10 areas throughout Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi). This survey took a sample of 993 junior and high school students. Notably, this survey shows that almost 50% of students agree with violence or radical actions for the sake of religion. 14.2% of the students agreed with the acts of terrorism committed by Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Coordinating M Top. 84.8% also agreed with enforcing Islamic law. Besides that, 25.8% considered Pancasila no longer relevant as the state ideology. This survey is an alarm or red light for the future of the Indonesian nation. To deal with this, Indonesia has two bodies that have worked hard to eradicate terrorism. The special Detachment 88 team is from the police and National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) or *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorism* (BNPT). However, the two bodies have not synergised optimally in the deradicalisation program and are still running individually in the fight against terror in Indonesia.

With such an empirical context, I will discuss the phenomenon of the radicalism of Muslim actors in post-New Order Indonesia in this thesis. But I will take a different course from most previous studies, which approach the question from a historical perspective. Islamic studies also review the effectiveness of each deradicalisation program imposed by the Indonesian government. This research also complements the radical Islamic movement phenomenon in Indonesia by using a social movement theory and social constructivism theory. Many actors execute several terrorist

acts in Indonesia. For example, an 18-year-old besieged Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (Mohanty, 2018). In 2011 a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in a mosque in a police compound in Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia. The attack occurred around 12:20 pm during Friday prayers. The bomber was 24 years old killed, and at least 28 people were injured, most of whom were praying in the mosque. The May 2018 self-destruction assailants included two adolescents, matured 16 and 18, just as two actor kids, who evolved 9 and 12, in three churches in Surabaya, East Java (McNamee, 2016).

Many terrorism cases are exposed and brought to court. Its victory in carrying out the arrest of terrorist actors has obtained appreciation from the international world. However, law enforcement has not followed the deradicalisation program's success by several government agencies. The threat of terrorism still haunts the community. Arrests and attacks of terrorism are still ongoing. Some of the terrorists' free detainees even returned to being terrorists and were caught. A few answerable for savage fanaticism in Indonesia have been understudies/graduated classes of instructive organisations. The writing demonstrates that Indonesian ladies (and youngsters) are progressively getting radicalised and joining fierce fanatic gatherings. The Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) has hailed 'expanded action concerning ladies and expanded aim to engage in a more dynamic warrior part' for quite a while (Hinicks, 2018). An expected 45% of Southeast Asians who voyaged to the ISIS-controlled region are ladies and youngsters who have gone with the men to battle there (this figure incorporates those joining bunches other than ISIS, for example, Jabhat Nusra) (Jawaid, 2017).

Reference is made to ladies and kids associated with late assaults completed by entire families in East Java (Extremism, 2018). Nonetheless, except for a couple of reports zeroed in on female enlistment, the writing on savage radicalism in Indonesia is sexually unbiased, utilising terms, for example, actor, understudies, graduated class, warriors, aggressors, jihadists, and radicals, and not recognising guys and females. For instance, (Hwang & Schulze, 2018) of 106 Indonesians who joined assailant Islamist associations break them down by geographic area and rough fanatic gathering, not by sexual orientation. Several responses from the government to overcome the act of terrorism, one of the policies made us implement deradicalisation as the Soft Approach policy. Unfortunately, the deradicalisation program has not been optimally implemented, which is marked by terrorist recidivists; yet, one of the aims of deradicalisation is to direct perpetrators to leave perspective, view, attitude, and the act of terrorism. This paper aims to describe the implementation of the deradicalisation program as one of the aspects in defining how successful the program applied in Indonesia. This research examines the pull and pushes factor from the radicalisation and the proactive engagement of the deradicalisation program carried out by the Indonesian government in Indonesia the special Detachment 88 team from the police. The reason is to compare each deradicalisation program from the two entities and identify its effectiveness in eradicating actor involvement in terrorist acts. It will distinguish the more significant determinants of the most effective deradicalisation program through surveys, interviews, and social experiments designed to observe the impact of each of these strategies.

2. Literature Review

Although the population is predominantly Muslim, Indonesia is not a country based on an Islamic system. The rapid growth of political parties based on Islam after independence and post-reformation does not indicate the formation of Indonesia as an Islamic state (D. F. Anwar, 2018). The implication is that Indonesia's foreign policy does not have an Islamic or non-Islamic character. The government must continue to avoid formal expressions of Islamic factors in foreign policy due to the nature of state identity, which maintains a non-theocratic identity. It should be borne in mind that the Indonesian economy has received a lot of pressure after the series of terror bombings in the country since October 2002. Indonesia's exports have decreased as well as increased credit risk, leaving no possibility for investment, either from foreign or domestic parties (K. Anwar, 2011). Another thing to note is the travel warning issued by several embassies, such as the US, Australia, and several Western European countries, for their citizens who want to travel to Indonesia. Psychologically, the issue of bomb terror has reduced the interest of foreign tourists to come to Indonesia. As a result, tourism has become a sector heavily affected by the bomb terror issue.

The magnitude of the economic loss and politics is felt to be one of Indonesia's reasons for trying to eliminate the image of bomb terrors driven by radical Islamic movements. Indonesia carries out this effort by providing an image of moderate Islam, especially in Western countries. Indonesia seeks a dialogical process pursued through diplomacy to establish sustainable cooperation with the Western world. Director of Information and Media, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, P.L.E. Priatna revealed that moderate Islam is only part of the image in promoting democracy which is driven through diplomacy. It should be noted beforehand that foreign policy has a different meaning from diplomacy. If foreign policy is concerned with the substance and content of foreign relations, diplomacy is more focused on the methodology for implementing foreign policy (Suryokusumo, 2004). The diplomatic route used by Indonesia in portraying moderate Islam is generally in the form of intensive dialogue such as interfaith, intercultural, and inter-civilisation dialogue. This matter intends to build mutual understanding between different religions and beliefs, cultures, and civilisations.

Exploration of this process takes place bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally. The dialogue process that is realised through bilateral relations can be seen from the Unity in Diversity: The Culture of Coexistence in Indonesia conference between Indonesia and Italy. Throughout 2008, Indonesia has conducted interfaith dialogue with Britain, Austria, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, Lebanon, and Australia. Meanwhile, in the regional and multilateral framework, similar dialogues can be found in ASEM since 2005. Specifically, for the Asia Pacific region, the Asia Pacific Conference on inter-religious cooperation and dialogue was also initiated in 2004 taking place in Yogyakarta. Another initiative taken by Indonesia in representing democracy and moderate Islam is to organise the BDF. The forum, which takes place at the intergovernmental level, places Indonesia as the pioneer of a forum that specifically discusses democracy in the Asian region. Since it was held for the first time in 2008, the enthusiasm of countries in the world participating in the event The BDF showed an increasing pattern, from 40 participants to 82 participants in 2012. This enthusiasm in turn gave birth to more intensive interactions between Indonesia and the countries that attended the event. Western democracies generally give recognition to the credibility of Indonesian Islam which is able to coexist with democracy. They also hope that Indonesia can play a role as the voice of world Islam to mediate between the West and Islam.

In addition, moderate Islam in Indonesia is also expected to be an alternative model that may be applied to other Muslim communities, such as the Middle East region. Several expectations from the international community are read by Indonesia as an opportunity to take a bigger role so that Indonesia has a stronger reason to portray the moderate Islam that exists in itself. Indonesia's perspective in seeing the world also has a crucial proportion in building this image. The national view of the world (worldview) is the dominant perception of character world system, at the same time taking place in the system itself. According to Paige Johnson Tan, despite experiencing a drastic change in leadership, the consistency of Indonesia's perspective on the global system can be seen from the country's contemporary history (Tan, 2007). Starting from the beginning of Indonesia's independence until now, this perspective has always been fulfilled by the desire for his country to have a role in the international world. This perspective is contained in Law Number 17 of 2007 concerning the National Long-Term Plan (RPJPN) 2005-2025. One of the targets is the realisation of Indonesia's increasing role in international relations.

The Muslim community views that the main issue in Indonesia's foreign policy in relation to Islam is not how to formulate and implement an Islamic foreign policy. However, it is more about the need to improve relations with Muslim countries and pay attention to issues in the Islamic world as well as take meaningful initiatives on these issues. They generally think that it is absurd that Indonesia, which has the largest Muslim population, only occupies a marginal position and plays a marginal role in the Islamic world (Sukma, 2010). Along with expectations for harmonious relations between Indonesia and the Middle East, there is also hope that these relations can provide economic benefits for Indonesia. This hope is because the trade between the two regions does not indicate a decline, the economic relations between the two have not reached the expected stage. The trade value between Indonesia and the Middle East is still far below the trade value between Indonesia-USA or Indonesia-Europe. In fact, the Middle East has an average growth of about 11 percent per year (Thaib, 2011).

As one of Indonesia's main trading partners, Eastern investment is relatively minimal. Compared to Japanese and South Korean investments, Indonesia is still not one of the main investment destinations for Middle Eastern countries. It should be noted that the investment potential from the Middle East is considered very significant, especially from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are part of the top three countries with the highest GDP value in the world according to the World Bank. In contrast to Indonesia, which has a non-theocratic principle, Islam in Malaysia itself has become more homogeneous. The consolidation of Islam in Malaysia reflects the role of the political religious of the sultans and the government in defining religion. The construction of religious authorities to look at religious issues in Malaysia has been started since the British colonial era. Although excluded from colonial administrative law, shari'a and customary law have been codified and relatively developed.

Through the Islamization program, Malaysia is earlier in representing a moderate Islamic identity compared to Indonesia. The formal Islamization of Malaysia began during the reign of Mahathir Mohammad. Mahathir's description of Malaysia's Islamic identity was first conveyed in his victory speech in the 1982 elections. He articulated his belief that Islam is a pragmatic and flexible religion that is the basis of every action. The projection cannot be separated from the tendency that religion should be a stabilising factor to ensure Malaysia's status as a strong, disciplined, and wise nation. This emphasis on identity also confirms that Malaysia is an Islamic state from the Islamic world. Internally, Islamization is focused on distinguishing between moderate and radical Islam. Conflicts that occur between moderate and radical groups in Malaysia have an impact on internal political competition that sparks debates about the role of Islam in society. Later, however, the Mahathir government considered moderate Islam to be more appropriate in describing the Malaysian social context (Nair, 2013).

Meanwhile, externally, Islamization is interpreted with a value system that has a positive relationship with the Western world. The articulation of Islam as a positive factor is related to the Malaysian government's concern about generalising Islam in a negative connotation during contemporary international relations. Therefore, one of the goals is to open up to the Western world, especially in technology investment and learning (Nair, 2013). Mahathir's preference

for portraying moderate Islam also seems to be related to the dislike of Western countries towards him. This Malaysian leader is indeed known to be anti-Western and is not liked by Western countries because of his sometimes harsh and harsh attitude, and his uncompromising policies (Fitriani, 2012). Under Mahathir's leadership, Malaysia has distanced itself from Western countries after long relying on British and US aid. However, this attitude is not meant for confrontation with the West.

Malaysia's relationship with the West is based on Mahathir's vision to make Malaysia a fully developed country by 2020. In developing Malaysia's economy, Mahathir hopes that a progressive-oriented image of Islam can be in line with acceleration and ideas for leadership in development. Finally, Malaysia's existence can be recognised by both the Western and Islamic worlds. In this case, Malaysia's involvement in issues of Islamic dimension can be seen multilaterally and bilaterally. Regarding the development of a moderate Islamic network, Malaysia under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak called on all countries of the world to participate in the GMM (Global Movement of Moderates). The aim of the GMM is to invite all countries to condemn and reject extremists. The GMM international conference was officially held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2012 (with a four-year gap with the BDF). The continuation of this conference was the establishment of the GMM Foundation as the first center for disseminating information on the concept of moderation in combating the specter of extremism. For this reason, GMM pays great attention to five study areas, namely the coexistence of peace, democracy, law, finance, education, and conflict resolution.

Indonesia before and after the 9 September 2001 attacks on the United States, the independence of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was only seen as a separatist movement. The Indonesian government is more defensive than offensive like the Philippine government in its approach to the ethnonationalist movement. The Indonesian government used a more subtle approach by negotiating with GAM or the Aceh movement to integrate its regions, especially after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004. However, the Indonesian government continued to use military action against GAM and continued into the post-Soeharto period. In fact, in May 2003, General Ryamizard Ryacudu in his explanation to journalists that the Indonesian military wanted to change their offensive actions in dealing with GAM for the sake of the integrity of the Indonesian state. General Ryamizard Ryacudu, as reported in Kompas, emphasised the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as the final price on the issue of separatism. In this view, through a historical journey, the national unity of Indonesia was ended in 1928 when youths from all parts of Indonesia met in Jakarta and then swore an oath to acknowledge that they had "one homeland, one nation, and one language, Indonesia" (www.kompas.com, 14 May 2003, accessed 18 March 2022).

For this general, this oath is an irreplaceable identity for all Indonesian citizens. Therefore, the history of the Acehese, who joined all Indonesian territories, fighting for Indonesian independence in Ryamizard Ryacudu's view is a betrayal of this oath, an identity that has been neutralised, he calls this Aceh rebellion "The people of the Republic of Indonesia, but naughty" (www.kompas.com, 14 May 2003, accessed 18 March 2022). This means that the views of the Indonesian military in the post-Soeharto era identified themselves as guardians of national unity. Before the tsunami disaster in Aceh on 26 December 2004, the war in Aceh was very clear that it would never end. Central government Indonesia in Jakarta has no alternative solution to the Acehese movement apart from the repressive actions of the Indonesian military. The repression appears to have sparked more armed Acehese resistance. Historically, in the post-independence period of Indonesia, the Acehese were granted the status of "special regions" within the Indonesian republic with special autonomy. Under the Indonesian government, Aceh was deprived due to the leadership of the central government. In 1953 the Darul Islam movement led by Governor Daud Bereuh, was followed by the Aceh rebellion, which declared Aceh's independence in 1953. In 1959, Aceh was granted "special territory" status characterised by autonomy in religious and educational affairs, and law. However, the central government in Jakarta has never actually fulfilled its promise of this special status (Crow, 2000).

In 1976, Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro led the Aceh Sumatran National Liberation Front (ASNLF) by declaring Aceh an independent country. The Indonesian military immediately crushed this movement quickly. Furthermore, in 1989, the Indonesian military through the Military Operations Area (DOM) in Aceh tried to get rid of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM/ASNLF). The Indonesian central government mobilised the military to institutionalise the state and was a counterattack to the GAM insurgency. The security forces, in their attempt to forcefully remove GAM members, were involved in dealing with human rights abuses. Many civilians died and were tortured, and villages suspected of being connected to GAM were systematically targeted by military attacks (Sulaiman, 2006).

Until the fall of Suharto in May 1998, many Acehese saw something with anger against the Indonesian military. In this period of reform, populist demands for greater autonomy or independence became very loud. The demand for a referendum style that had been held in East Timor in 1999 reached its peak that year, fueled by a variety of factors, including promises not fulfilled by the Indonesian president at the time; too many publicised killings by the Indonesian military in previous years; and the permitting of a referendum in East Timor by the Indonesian government, raised Acehese hopes that a similar event would very likely happen in Aceh (Schulze, 2006).

However, the referendum in Aceh never took place. The Indonesian government instead only gave 'special autonomy' after the reform period and started a new approach through negotiations. This policy strategy brought the Acehese to their memories of the past with the same policies that occurred in the 1950s which were never fulfilled by

the Indonesian government. Therefore, GAM then sought international support. After the 9 September tragedy in the United States, GAM was almost included in the list of terrorist groups by the United States. Although GAM did not directly participate in terrorist attacks linked to Al-Qaeda, it did have contacts with a number of organisations linked to the Al-Qaeda network. Moreover, GAM's insurgency and terrorist activities, including arms smuggling, money laundering, and war games, contribute economically to the regional terrorist network. A peace treaty will bore a hole in the cobwebs of terrorist links in Southeast Asia (Dillon, 2005).

Suddenly, the tsunami disaster dashed hopes that GAM would reconcile with Indonesia. The tsunami waves destroyed the coast of Sumatra and killed about 130,000 Acehnese. GAM quickly requested a ceasefire with the TNI, which in turn provided important assistance in the recovery effort after the tsunami disaster. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, negotiations between the military and armed groups GAM intensified and there was a clearer will, on both sides, to reach a permanent peace agreement. The situation after the tsunami has led to different conditions for the Aceh movement and the Indonesian central government through its military. In the previous period, the GAM group demanded independence for Aceh; in the current peace proposal, GAM then agreed to accept autonomy within the state of Indonesia. In turn, Indonesia gave GAM the right to form local political parties. The two sides have reached a negotiated agreement in Helsinki, Finland (Dillon, 2005).

Identity seems to be very important, especially in today's conditions. The formation of identity through history and geography has shown its dynamics in its formation. In case for post-colonial countries in Southeast Asia, the formation of their identity is through a long history. The identity of the Pattani, Moro, and Acehnese nationalist movements was shaped through their relationships with Arab, Chinese, Indian, and European traders. Furthermore, Islamic values occupy an important role to become the main values of the identity of the Patani, Moro and Acehnese. In fact, Islamic values can be assimilated with traditional culture in the period before the entry of Islam. Another influence came from European colonialists who challenged traditional culture and Islam. Because of this, the Pattani, Moro movements in the Philippines and the Acehnese in Indonesia became a mixture of cultures and then created a unique display of the identity of these three groups. Their unique identity can be seen from their social structure.

The state approach in these three countries seems to have reached a dead end. This stalemate is due to their policies that impose the identity of the dominant rulers in each country, so that the assimilation process carried out by each central government fosters a wider range of separatism. Then, this state approach seems to only follow in the footsteps of the colonialists who once colonised Southeast Asia which also had the same impact as what happened to the colonialists, namely the failure of the government to accommodate minority identities in a multi-ethnic nation-state in Southeast Asia. Seeing these facts, the governments of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia must use an approach as a multicultural nation (multicultural nation approach). With this approach, a nation state such as Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia will be able to accommodate the diversity of identities that exist in it in equality.

3. Results

Handling terrorism in Indonesia is becoming increasingly important considering the development of information technology that makes it easier for all elements of society to access some information related to anything including terrorism. The crime of terrorism is an extraordinary crime and the most serious threat in the life of society, nation and state which has been disturbing public security and order. The sense of security for the community is the responsibility of the government to prevent and eradicate criminal acts of terrorism for the sake of a peaceful Indonesia that needs to be carried out in a planned and sustainable manner. Besides that, youth who are considered as pawns of driving the nation's progress are the main focus of this research, so there is a need for a specific deradicalisation process for youth recovery. Youth is known as a figure who is still critical, many curiosities that must be met. Special psychological needs need to be explored specifically for youth, so it cannot carry out general deradicalisation but specifically according to their individual needs.

In this chapter, the author also obtains some data from informants regarding the role of agencies dealing with the issue of deradicalisation such as BNPT and Detachment 88 in Indonesia. Synergy is needed to maximise the handling of deradicalisation in Indonesia. This is because the two institutions have a lot of potential in dealing with the issue of terrorism in Indonesia. Detachment 88 since the beginning has a strong collaboration with many institutions. Various forms of cooperation undertaken by Detachment 88 AT Polri with the community, such as a program preventing the spread of radical ideas in society through cooperation with religious leaders in the environment who are considered prone to co-optation of understandings radical, to deradicalisation programs or purification of understanding again by the Detachment 88 Prevention team AT Polri by conducting coaching and visits regular gatherings with deportants and prisoners terrorism so that when it is later free those concerned understand that what he understood so far is wrong path that should not be continued to join ISIS is a radical group, terror groups who think that their ideology is understand the most correct and mandatory to be followed for the sake of safety in the hereafter after death later when not so according to the views of the scholars, the scholars agree that the teachings of ISIS are heretical teachings that can endanger the national security of both the state and the people who live in it and ISIS never has become part of the teachings of Islam because the teachings of ISIS are not none of which relate to Islamic teachings indeed.

One effective strategy to break the chain the spread of various kinds of radical understanding is by open up information about current understandings translated unilaterally by radical groups clearly and objectively do not see from one side just look, but from various angles view, open wide-spread views in society that what is said or disseminated by radical groups so far is teaching wrong and misguided and it is appropriate not to followed by the community because there are no teaching values Islam contained in it and of course that the most important is the filtration or filtration of various kinds understanding that enters the community environment that everything has to be cross-checked first to those who understand the science of religion as a whole not those who understand the science of religion in half.

In the document on terror, terrorism is defined as all acts of violence as a weapon to achieve the goal politics with the method of murder that carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, spread threats and fear to civilians. Terrorist activities have a goal to make people others feel scared so with thus attracting people's attention, group or nation. Terrorism used as a psychological weapon to create an atmosphere of panic, no determine and create public distrust of government capacity and coercion certain communities or groups to obey the will of the terrorists. With regard to terrorism, several terrorist actors and figures have been arrested and even executed but acts of terrorism continue to this day. Initially, the government relied on a strategy of repression with a violent or hard approach. This strategy has been carried out by Detachment 88 and has succeeded in uncovering and capturing various terror tragedies in the country, however, this strategy was not enough. Even with the case of the death of Siyono, a suspected terrorist, it shows the weakness of the violent approach or hard approach in dealing with criminal acts of terrorism so that it is contrary to human rights. Therefore, another strategy is needed, namely a soft approach, one of which is through deradicalisation (Handayani et al., 2016).

Deradicalisation is all efforts to neutralise radical ideas through interdisciplinary approaches, such as law, psychology, religion, and socio-culture for those who are influenced or exposed to radical and/or pro-violent ideas. The deradicalisation program is intended as a "harm reduction" effort aimed at a handful of the nation's children who have been exposed and actively joined (core and militant groups) in carrying out acts of terrorism, both individually and in groups. To overcome the problem of terrorism, the government through the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), conducts deradicalisation by involving many parties ranging from ministries and institutions, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), the Army Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), universities, to civil society such as community organisations and non-governmental organisations.

BNPT was founded in 2010 after the bombings at two large hotels in Jakarta and the revelation of plans to attack President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono which all occurred in 2009. BNPT is an Indonesian non-ministerial government agency tasked with carrying out government duties in the field of counterterrorism. BNPT is led by a head who is responsible to the President through the coordination of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. BNPT was formed based on Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 concerning the National Counterterrorism Agency which was later amended by Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2012 concerning Amendments to Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 concerning the National Agency for Countering Terrorism (Perpres BNPT). In Article 2 paragraph (1) of the Presidential Regulation of BNPT it is stated that BNPT has duties, consisting of: 1). formulate national policies, strategies and programs in the field of counterterrorism; 2). coordinating government agencies related to the implementation and implement policies in the field of counter terrorism; and 3). implement policies in the field of counter terrorism with form task forces consisting of elements of the institution relevant government in accordance with the duties, their respective functions and powers.

Furthermore, in Article 2 paragraph (2) the Presidential Regulation of BNPT states that: counter-terrorism sector includes prevention, protection, deradicalisation, prosecution and preparation national preparedness. In supporting the duties and functions, the composition of The BNPT organisation consists of the Head, Main Secretariat, Deputy for Division Prevention, Protection and Deradicalization, Deputy for Enforcement and Capacity Building, Deputy for International Cooperation, and Inspectorate. In the structure and work procedures BNPT has a Directorate of Deradicalization in under deputy I for Prevention Protection and Deradicalization (Article 6 Presidential Decree BNPT). As for the Deputy for Prevention, Protection and Deradicalization is under and responsible to the Head of BNPT (Article 11 paragraph (1)). Meanwhile, Deputy Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalization is led by the Deputy (Art 11 paragraph (2)). Deputy for Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalization has the task of formulating coordinate, and implement national policies, strategies and programs counter terrorism in the field of prevention, protection, and deradicalisation. (Article 12) and details its duties are stated in Article 13.

Regarding deradicalisation by BNPT in general deradicalisation design has four approaches, namely reeducation, rehabilitation, resocialisation, and reintegration. Reeducation is a deterrent by teaching enlightenment to society about radicalism, so that this understanding does not occur. As for terrorism convicts, re-education is done by giving enlightenment is related to the deviant doctrines that teach violence so that they realise that commit violence like a suicide bombing is not an identified jihad with acts of terrorism. Rehabilitation has two meanings, namely the development of independence and personality development, coaching independence is training and fostering ex-convicts prepare skills and expertise, use is so that after they come out of correctional institution, they have have

expertise and can open jobs. Whereas personality development is to do approach by dialogue with the terrorist convicts so that they can set their minds straightened out and have an understanding comprehensive and acceptable different from them. The rehabilitation process is carried out by cooperate with various parties such as the police, prisons, Ministry of Religion, Ministry of People's Welfare, organisations, and so on. It is hoped that this understanding will develop.

There are four strategies that can be assessed deal with threats and actions terrorism, namely: First Strategy, perfect the strategy focused on law enforcement and balanced with prevention and protection to obtain comprehensive results, so that the movement of terrorism can be severely suppressed and the root of the problem can be solved through a combination of soft and hard approach. In this case it is necessary amendment to Law Number 15 2003 concerning Eradication Criminal Acts of Terrorism that regulates mechanism of deradicalisation comprehensive for countermeasures terrorism. Besides that, it is necessary considered to strengthen the existing BNPT Presidential Regulation regarding functions of deradicalisation. The second strategy is, take full advantage of potential resources state power through the involvement of elements related to the superstructure, infrastructure, and substructure. By publishing relevant rules, whether they are public or internal agencies and continued with real efforts everyone that element. The third strategy is, by synergising all sectoral lines in countering terrorism has been carried out by various components and not compartmentalised. This effort can be done through the preparation of rules coordination between components, optimisation the role of BNPT, namely by strengthening the position, function, and authority of BNPT in a separate law. Fourth strategy with enhance foreign cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism maximum, in order to suppress the network terrorism that has affiliation with abroad as well as complete the roots problems involving issues outside Indonesian territory. In improving foreign cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism is carried out through increasing Indonesia's active role in regional and international forums counter terrorism and enhancement of cooperative relations in operational and tactical areas with countries concerned with prioritising the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BNPT, elements of law enforcement, security, and intelligence and sub-structure.

In addition, the role of the government area is also very important for closing opportunities for groups terrorism to act. For example, through embodiment of economic development in underdeveloped areas, the role of sector agencies supervision of the performance of institutions in regions as well as the use of the budget and government facilities to support marginalised groups. One of form to realise optimisation strategies in dealing with threats criminal acts of terrorism in Indonesia then need to strengthen the position, function and the authority of BNPT. here is a need for BNPT to enhance its coordination especially in information exchange with State Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Service Strategy which is then continued in the enforcement process. BNPT must control from investigation to the coaching process in the prison and deradicalisation in every case of criminal acts of terrorism which happened in Indonesia.

4. Discussion

This deradicalisation is a form of effort to change from a radical understanding to a non-radical for people who have influenced by radical beliefs. That matter carried out using a multi-approach method and interdisciplinary. BNPT also cooperates with organisations Islam because Islamic organisations have strong power to fortify radical understanding in Indonesia and return the terrorists to moderate Islam. They fully support at the forefront to maintain NKRI. In addition, it also invites young people to against ISIS because currently ISIS is also targeting generations young followers. Young people get carried away easily and influenced by radical ideas. One of the efforts is through education. Education it is very important to inculcate that thinking moderate. BNPT has also built a mosque in Sumatra North and East Java. With the establishment of this mosque the ex-terrorist community has further improved in terms of religion and nationality. Apart from that, it also does friendship with former terrorists aimed at mutual understanding forgive and create peace so that there is no there is radicalism in them. According to Inspector General. Pol. Dr. Drs. Petrus Reinhard Golose, M.M. who serves as Deputy for Cooperation

BNPT International, Deradicalization is all efforts to neutralise radical notions through approaches interdisciplinarity, such as law, psychology, religion, and social culture for those who are influenced or exposed understand radical or pro-violence. The deradicalisation approach carried out by the BNPT namely by carrying out several activities. This includes deterrence, rehabilitation, re-education, as well resocialisation. Ideological deterrence program or de-ideologies is a deradicalisation cognitive program done by stopping the process of understanding and the spread of Islamic radical ideology owned by terrorist group. This program is often called ideologicalization. This program is the main key in raising awareness in the process of reorienting terrorist thinking in order to return to the true understanding of Islam. The following activities are carried out in deradicalisation approach is rehabilitation. Rehabilitation specifically for someone who has been prosecuted law and subject to criminal sanctions or have status as prisoner. This rehabilitation is done to change radical ideology in the person becomes the ideology that inclusive. Where the person is fostered by coaching religiously, fostered his personality and independence.

After the rehabilitation program continued with re-education program. Re-education is done in a way reinterpret and change thinking regarding the order in religion where it should be in religion is taught to maintain peace and tolerance in religion and society. This program intended for perpetrators of terrorism, former perpetrators of terrorism

and also the families of the perpetrators of terrorism. The last is the resocialisation program. This resocialisation is done by bringing together the former perpetrators of terrorism and their families in life society so that they can become citizens of Indonesia good and can interact back with society in a better way than before. In short, this deradicalisation is an effort to turn someone back to the proper path with religion and national and state life, provide an understanding of mutual tolerance among people religion and eliminate the radical nature that exists in oneself the person becomes not radical. Next attempt is to prevent the person from coming back on his radical group and kept him out of place the group.

The BNPT's efforts in dealing with the issue of terrorism are still not optimal, this was conveyed in an interview on 20 September 2022 with Dr. Muhammad Syauquillah Chairman of the Terrorism Study Program at the School of Strategic and Global Studies at the University of Indonesia (UI). However, we also cannot mention that the BNPT's efforts have also failed. This is due to the many deradicalisation challenges that must be synergised between several stakeholders from several ministries and institutions in Indonesia. Currently, there is a regulation regarding deradicalisation Number 1 of 2021 regarding the implementation of deradicalisation of defendants and convicts of terrorism. This means that in terms of integration, the rules exist, but their implementation is still not realised, and this is a challenge for each ministry and institution. The government also needs to cooperate with Civil Society Organizations (CSO) for deradicalisation outside prisons. The CSOs in question must coordinate well so that the accused terrorists receive double benefits from ministries and institutions.

In several countries, CSOs play an important role in various policies and activities handling terrorism, such as campaigns against terrorism and strengthening community resilience civil servants working with stakeholders related policies. In Indonesian context, handling and counter-terrorism is still dominant in hard power approach. This condition results the involvement of CSOs is still minimal every handling of terrorism in Indonesia. Especially when there is involvement of CSOs, several problems arise, namely still not well coordinated CSO activities and seems sporadic. In addition, until now still not many CSO initiatives have become movements with together and synergise with the government. Engagement-related issues CSO in handling and overcoming. This terrorism can be handled by regulating the role of CSOs in implementing regulations Terrorism Crime Act. Effort revision of the current terrorism law is a door appropriate entry to reinforce the role.

Despite the difficulties in defining terrorism, the concept can be well understood if looked upon three significant features. Firstly, violence that includes all sorts of deliberate attack on the people with several aims that includes but not limited to creations of fear and wanton destructions. Secondly, terrorism is an action that target civilians, this make them to draw national and international attention. Another important attribute of terrorism is motivation, they are motivated by political and or religious objectives albeit falsely. Indicators of success in this deradicalisation program cannot be measured within a certain period, it must be seen from the response of the partners and cannot be resolved when the ex-terrorists have finished participating in the deradicalisation program. This ex-terrorist must also be accompanied throughout his life according to his degree of dependence and what his needs are. So that the deradicalisation program is very dynamic in its implementation. One of the indicators that they are participating in the deradicalisation process is by bai'at, as well as the flag ceremony. Even then, it is only a formality and must be supported by an ongoing program. In the process of deradicalisation, the ex-terrorists are provided with experts in the field of religion, psychologists and teachers from outside according to their fields. Because they are not only the perpetrators of the bombings, but they also have certain roles. For example, as a field coordinator, provider of materials and so forth. They are equipped with various knowledge about defending the country, Pancasila and religion.

One indicator of the success of the deradicalisation program carried out by the BNPT is seen from the decreasing number of bombing incidents, the incident rate is relatively low. Like the Bali bomb killed a higher number of people but now it is lower. So, the BNPT succeeded in reducing the number of incidents as well as the quality of the incidents. This is enough to make ordinary people aware that terrorism is real and must be crushed together, no longer a conspiracy. In the BNPT structure, there are sections that deal with the issue of terrorism starting from the prevention division. Preventing the spread of radical thoughts that have the potential to lead to extreme actions that lead to acts of terror. As for the product that was developed by counterpropaganda, it is a counter-narrative issued by the media, Peace Indonesiaku. Besides that, the government also monitors several books circulating in society to prevent the spread of ideology that is not straight. BNPT also forms cyber ambassadors who come from students in each province.

This deradicalisation program must continue to follow based on the characteristics of the person. Each ministry and agency have its own syllabus, as well as its own interventions. Therefore, it is also a weakness between ministries and institutions in working together in one forum that mutually reinforces the process of deradicalisation of terrorism in Indonesia. Early detection of ex-terrorist needs is necessary because everyone has different needs, so the country's resources can be used according to their needs. Because, currently, a lot is happening in the field, one person receives overlapping assistance.

The BNPT also empowered ex-terrorists to assist in deradicalisation for ex-terrorists who had just conducted the training. Of course, the election must be someone who truly repents and has an aura its members respect. It is to make it easier for the government to get involved in rectifying the ideology of groups exposed to extreme networks. Even

though the ex-terrorists have been returned to the community, the government still informs the head of the area where they live, be it the head of the village or the head of the neighbourhood association, so they are still accepted, supervised and fostered while returning to society. It is what is called deradicalisation outside prison. The weakness of the program that the BNPT has carried out is from the ex-terrorists themselves because those who were given funds to make a living again misused them. For example, they were given 10 goats, but in the end, they sold them instead of using them as a new production source. Some are given capital to open a stall, but in the end, they consume the goods they sell for personal gain.

Various government and non-government elements have attempted to carry out deradicalisation programs, including the Muhammadiyah religious organisation. Based on an interview conducted directly with Mr. Abdullah Darraz, a Muhammadiyah Intellectual Cadre and also a Director of the MAARI Institute for Cultural and Humanity on 20 September, 2022, he said that in handling this, Muhammadiyah is making more moderate deradicalisation efforts how to moderate the thinking of extreme people so they are not radical. In practice, Muhammadiyah does not use the word deradicalisation but rather moderation. Muhammadiyah's current tendency is to save the wider majority in the sense of the word more to maximise prevention efforts.

5. Conclusions

In conclusion, this study indicates that Indonesia is not many synergies between these mass organisations with one or that even small organisations within the community, the government should focus more on embracing and directing through movement training radical too small for mass organisations, which is great for good communication between organisations from different regions even in eradicating terrorism in Indonesia. But as you can see that the Ormas Perpu has now been passed, and the number of mass organisations that were merged or disbanded by the government, it is also good, and the government wants to limit radical mass organisations. In an effort to deal with terrorism, community participation is needed to participate in counter-terrorism activities actively. Implementation carried out by every country that has the potential threat of terrorism by establishing a strategy and policies. It aims to do denial of access for terrorist groups to goals, targets, and negative impacts that are mass which is the goal of implementation of their actions/activities.

Therefore, society must be embraced by government or religious leaders to participate in and provide direction to the community more systematically about radicalism to eradicate terrorism because not all levels of society exist in Indonesia. Therefore, the government and especially the BNPT can embrace people, organisations, communities that exist in Indonesia, in directing and making source of information, there will be a set somewhat deviant community in the neighbourhood in the middle of society. apart from being able to help goal achievement. In Indonesia itself, indeed not too much synergy between the mass organisations on the other as well as that small organisation in community environment, then the government should focus more on embracing and directing through training on radical movements for small to large organisations so that there is good communication between mass organisations in different regions even in eradication terrorism in Indonesia. Accordingly, many other ideologies and ideologies do not have a place, so they cannot thrive in Indonesia. Because the problem of terrorism is not a group problem but the nation's problem that must be fought by all elements of society and have a shared commitment.

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